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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of natural disaster experiences on banks’ busi-
ness practices. Using earthquake and banking data for California, we find that
banks that have had stronger earthquake experiences change their practices, both
as a result of the natural disasters’ effects on local deposit supply and through
changes in banks’ risk perceptions. These banks have a smaller exposure to real
estate, maintain higher equity levels, and are more likely to lend to high-income
borrowers. This paper confirms, therefore, that institutional memory exists in the
banking sector and that banks and communities adapt to natural disasters interac-
tively.
JEL Codes: D53, D83, G11, G21, Q54
1 Introduction
Banks lend funds to companies and households, thereby ideally promoting and sustaining
firm productivity and enhancing customers’ welfare. The extent to which banks can
perform this role can be greatly affected by shocks, in particular natural hazards. It is
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The Netherlands, j.bos@maastrichtuniversity.nl. Li: Maastricht University School of Business and Eco-
nomics, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands, r.li@maastrichtuniversity.nl. The usual
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commonly known that natural disasters affect banks in two distinct ways. On the one
hand, natural disasters temporarily stimulate the demand for loans by destroying firms’
productive capital and household property. On the other hand, natural disasters usually
trigger defaults of existing loans and therefore may lead banks to become more cautious
in issuing loans, resulting in an insufficient credit supply to support economic recovery.
There is ample evidence on how banks adjust their asset structures and lending
activities after various types of natural disasters (Berg and Schrader, 2012; Chavaz, 2014;
Collier et al., 2011; Corte´s and Strahan, 2017; Klomp, 2014). However, most studies focus
on the immediate response of banks to catastrophes and overlook the long-term impact
of disaster experiences on banks’ balance sheet structures and lending patterns.
In this paper, we argue that examining the long-run relationship between banks
and natural disasters affords us with important additional insights on the effects of large
shocks to the financial sector. A first insight relates to the long-run changes in the supply
of banks’ funds as a result of disaster experiences. For example, we know already that
banks are sensitive to their exposure to real estate because real estate loans are prone to
defaults after a shock (Hott, 2011). But it is more interesting to know how banks adjust
their real estate lending in the long run. Of course, banks that repeatedly experience
disaster-related defaults tend to purposefully contract their real estate loans. But such a
reduction in loans may also reflect changes in external market forces. Specifically, intense
disaster experiences can lead to reallocation of economic activities from one county to
another, resulting in a long-run drop in either banks deposits or the demand for real estate
loans. A short-run analysis cannot capture such a gradual demographic and economic
evolution, which is why we need a long-term investigation.
A second insight relates to the resilience of banks to future shocks. After all, even
if we know that banks with a higher equity buffer can better satisfy the disaster-driven
increase in credit demand than banks with a lower equity level, we still need to establish
whether such adeptness is the result of them having gradually learned from their hazard
experiences, or whether each new shock triggers a reaction that is independent of previous
disaster experiences. If banks have indeed become more prudent and then decide to keep
a higher capital level after learning from their past disaster experiences, they will be more
resilient to future disasters. We therefore study how long-run disaster experiences have
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shaped banks equity buffers.
A third and final insight relates to quality adjustments as a result of disaster experi-
ences. In addition to reforming their balance sheet structure to enhance their resilience to
future shocks, banks that have stronger disaster experiences may adjust their loan quality.
Though theories have predicted that higher capital enhances screening and monitoring
and thus promotes the access to credit of poor borrowers (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997;
Mehran and Thakor, 2011), banks may still switch to high-income borrowers if disasters
have increased the perceived riskiness of their loans to a great extent. Furthermore, by
tightening the budget constraint, repeated disasters may worsen the discrimination issue
in ethnic minorities’ loan applications if banks have subjective bias against minority peo-
ple. Motivated by these concerns, we study how long-run natural disaster experiences
have affected banks’ lending preferences.
These insights are closely related. Put it simply, to protect themselves from losses,
banks repeatedly experiencing disaster-related defaults may boost their capital level, re-
duce their exposure to risky loans, and target borrowers with a better credit quality.
Each of these attempts at reducing disaster risk exposure has its own distinct features.
Except for the capitalization that largely captures the bank’s own risk expectation, both
the real estate loan and lending patterns are heavily determined by market forces. Specif-
ically, by triggering the flow of migrants (Elliott, 2014), disasters change the residential
composition of a region (e.g. income level, labor productivity, and race), alter the supply
of deposits or the demand for loans, and resultantly affect the level of risky loans and
lending patterns of banks. In this respect, my risk-taking measures weave together a
general equilibrium story, which, to my knowledge, has not been fully documented either
by theoretical or empirical studies.
In this paper, we therefore answer three, related research questions. First, we ex-
amine whether banks having stronger disaster experiences maintain a lower level of real
estate loans and a higher level of capital. Second, we study whether higher disaster
exposure leads banks to prefer high-income borrowers and become more biased against
ethnic minorities when extending loans. Third, in order to explore what makes long-run
disaster experiences particularly salient for the decision making of banks and to address
the long-run changes banks’ customer bases, we analyze the supply and demand sides
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of bank funds, that is, whether the local population and deposits in bank branches have
changed over the past years because of natural disasters.
To answer these related questions, we focus on banks (1994 to 2013) and earthquakes
(1769 to 2013) in California. The reasons for choosing California are threefold. First,
earthquakes are the dominant natural hazard in California, occurring with a relatively
high frequency compared to other types of disasters.1 Second, since earthquakes hap-
pen frequently and have received much attention from research institutes and the state
government, historical earthquake records are abundant and easy to retrieve. Third, the
California state government provides exemplary access to various economic and demo-
graphic data, e.g. unemployment rate, population, and household income. Such com-
prehensiveness of the data allows me to robustly identify the effect of the earthquake
experience.
My results confirm that long-run experiences do affect banks’ risk attitudes and re-
silience to future shocks by altering the balance sheet structure and loan quality. Specif-
ically, we find that banks that have had more intense earthquake experiences maintain a
lower level of real estate loans, boost their equity buffer, and prefer high-income borrow-
ers compared with banks having less intense experiences. For example, an increase in the
earthquake experience from its 10th percentile to its 90th percentile is associated with a
decrease in the proportion of real estate loan to total assets of 3.1 percent and a decrease
in interest income of 4.9 percent. Further, using deposit data at the branch level and
demographic data at the county level, we find such changes are related to the evolution
of local deposit supply. Particularly, more intense disaster experiences lead to decreases
in both the deposit supply and the median household income. Last but not least, we
find that banks whose earthquake experiences are in the bottom decile tend to increase
their real estate loans and reduce their equity level, indicating that banks continuously
surviving from smaller disasters may become more risk-loving. In every regression, the
coefficient on the experience variable is significant even after controlling for geographic
diversification (as will be explained in Section 2).
1Another major type of disaster in California is wildfire. But unlike earthquakes that can hit both
the residential and non-residential areas, wildfires mainly occur in non-residential regions and thus have
little effect on banks.
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My study connects to three strands of literature. First, the literature on macroeco-
nomic experiences and individuals’ risk taking shows that investors who have experienced
high stock market returns are more willing to take risks (Malmendier and Nagel, 2011),
and that banks that have undergone difficult economic periods tend to maintain a higher
capital level and are more prudential in issuing loans (Bouwman and Malmendier, 2015).
We contribute to this literature by showing that, besides economic factors, natural haz-
ards can also affect banks’ risk attitudes and alter their asset structure in the long run.
Second, my paper complements the currently popular literature on the relationship
between natural disasters and bank lending (Berg and Schrader, 2012; Chavaz, 2014;
Collier et al., 2011; Corte´s and Strahan, 2017). Particularly, by verifying that banks
adjust their balance sheet structure according to their long-term disaster experiences, we
show that the response of a bank to a new disaster depends on its own disaster history.
Further, my results confirm that early earthquakes do not easily fade away from the
memory of banks and thus significantly influence banks’ current financial decisions.
Third, by investigating the channels making disaster experiences crucial for banks,
my paper connects to the financing growth literature (King and Levine, 1993; Levine,
1997; Pagano, 1993). Importantly, we show that communities also learn from earthquake
experiences, leading to changes in their population and income structures throughout the
history. Such evolution is responsible for changes in the business practices of banks. To
sum up, to the best of my knowledge, my study is the first to link the balance sheet
structure and loan quality of banks to their long-term natural disaster experiences.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the data, visualizes earthquakes,
and summarizes key statistics. Section 3 explains the empirical method and identifica-
tion strategy. Section 4 presents and interprets my empirical results, explores changes
in market forces associated with disaster experiences, and discusses robustness checks.
Section 5 concludes.
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2 Data, Variables, and Descriptive Statistics
We use data from a variety of sources to construct my variables of interest. In this section,
we explain how to obtain my data and compile variables. The key dependent variables are
measures of risk taking while the chief explanatory variable is the earthquake experience.
2.1 Measures of Risk Taking
My measures of risk taking can be classified into two categories. The first set of measures
is based on the balance sheet structure of banks. Following the common practice, we
use capital ratios and the share of risky loans to measure risk taking. The second set of
measures is based on banks’ lending inclination. Specifically, we examine whether banks
tend to be biased toward different types of borrowers in terms of their income and race.2
2.1.1 Measures Based on Balance Sheet Structure
We construct the capital ratio and the real estate loan ratio with balance sheet information
from the quarterly Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports) for all
commercial banks of California over the period 1994Q1 to 2013Q4.3 The Call Reports
data are at the bank level. However, since a bank’s disaster experience is an aggregate
of its branch-level experiences, we later match branches to their headquarters using bank
identifiers.
The level of risky loans is a crucial measure of bank risk taking. Among all types
of loans, the real estate loan accounts for the biggest part of the total loans (about 50
percent; see Table 1 for descriptive statistics) and is an important source of income for
2In this paper, for simplicity we often count among my dependent variables as risk-taking measures.
However, except for the capital ratio that is a pure risk-taking measure, all other variables reflect to some
extent external market conditions. For instance, real estate loans are partly determined by the supply
and demand of funds by consumers and industries and are not fully decided by banks on their own. In
fact, exploring the “market forces” channel constitutes an important part of this study and distinguishes
my paper from those on individuals’ lifetime experiences.
3This does not mean, however, that we only have 20 years of records of earthquakes. In fact, since the
experience variable is constructed based on bank branches, some of which were established circa 1850,
we use the earthquake data from the early 19th century to the present.
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commercial banks. Meanwhile, real estate loans have been recognized as the main culprit
of bank failures during the global financial crisis (Cole and White, 2012). Earthquakes can
impose tremendous damage to buildings relative to other kinds of natural disasters. We
therefore use the real estate ratio, defined as Real estate loan/total assets, as a risk-taking
measure.
The capital ratio is a commonly used variable in the literature to characterize the
willingness of a bank to take risks (Berger and Bouwman, 2013; Lambert et al., 2015;
Thakor, 2014). It measures a bank’s amount of equity relative to its total assets. Banks
with higher capital have a greater capability of surviving adverse financial conditions
(Berger and Bouwman, 2013), while banks with lower capital are more prone to defaults
that can be pronounced during natural disaster periods (Collier, 2014). We therefore use
the capital ratio as a risk-taking measure. Specifically, in line with Berger and Bouwman
(2013), we define the capital ratio as the ratio of total equity to GTA, where GTA is total
assets plus the allowance for loan and lease losses and the allocated transfer risk reserve.4
2.1.2 Measures Based on Lending Preferences
In this study, we go a step further by measuring risk taking from banks’ lending pref-
erences. A conservative bank expecting a higher default probability of its loans may
carefully evaluate borrowers and choose to lend to those who are able to repay loans
in time. In the light of this statement, we construct a borrower income measure and
a borrower race measure from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data for all
California commercial banks over the period 2010 to 2013. The HMDA database contains
public loan data for various types of lending institutions, including banks, saving asso-
ciations, credit unions, and other mortgage lending institutions. A lending institution,
say, a branch of a bank, needs to report all loan transactions for a whole calendar year.
Each transaction record contains up to 45 variables, including the institution’s ID, loan
amount, borrower’s income, and the borrower’s race.
These two measures are at the year-bank level. The borrower income measure is
4The equity ratio is frequently referred to as “equity ratio”, “equity capital ratio”, or “capitalization”.
It is also commonly represented by the Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio defined by Basel III report in many
studies (Lambert et al., 2015; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2016).
7
constructed as follows. For each year, we calculate a bank’s mean borrower income by
taking the average of all branch-level borrower income. As income is positively related
to credit quality, we posit that a bank may prefer to lend to high-income borrowers if
stronger earthquake experiences have led the bank to become more risk-averse.
The borrower race measure is defined as the proportion of a bank’s nonwhite bor-
rowers each year. Specifically, for every bank, we calculate the ratio of the number of
nonwhite borrowers (denoted by 1 to 4 in the “Applicant Race 1” entry) to the number
of all borrowers. Since one of the purposes of the HMDA data is to identify possible dis-
criminatory lending patterns, we complement this purpose by exploring whether lending
discrimination can be driven by natural disasters that impose fund constraints on banks.
2.2 Explanatory Variables
2.2.1 The Earthquake Experience
The key explanatory variable in my study is the earthquake experience. Intuitively, it
has a straightforward meaning as the measure of how strongly a bank has been affected
by earthquakes, which are largely exogenous, during its operating history. One concern is
the endogeneity problem that can arise if banks deliberately choose to open in less riskier
regions. We tackle this important issue in detail in Section 3.
To construct the earthquake experience variable, we use bank branch data and earth-
quake data. The branch data are from the Summary of Deposits (SOD) of the FDIC.
The SOD is a publicly available annual survey that reports branch-level deposits for all
FDIC-insured institutions. Aside from the deposit data, the SOD also records the geo-
graphic coordinates, county of location, and the date of establishment for each branch.
The headquarter bank of each branch is identified by the FDIC Certificate Number. The
data reveal that the history of Californian banks can be dated back to the middle of
the nineteenth century. For example, the Bank of Stockton, one of the oldest banks in
California, is established on August 12, 1867. To account for earthquake experiences of
old banks, we therefore need a long list of historical earthquakes.
Fortunately, the earthquake data of California are available and complete. We com-
pile the earthquake data from two major sources. The first source is the geological survey
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by Stover and Coffman (1993) in PDF format that covers the earthquakes of California
from 1769 to 1989. The second source is the Search Earthquake Catalog of the United
States Geological Survey (USGS). It is a digital database that contains more compre-
hensive earthquake records since 1932. Before 1932, however, the USGS records are
sparse. To form my earthquake dataset, we therefore manually take the records of Stover
and Coffman (1993) from 1769 to 1931 and combine them with the USGS records from
1932 to 2013. The four variables we use to characterize each earthquake are the time
of occurrence, latitude, longitude, and the magnitude. As figures convey more powerful
information, we plot earthquakes of California from 2006-2010 in Figure 1. The figure
confirms that earthquakes are indeed a prevalent natural disaster in California: Events
occur nearly all over the state, including the economically developed costal regions. How-
ever, there are also a few counties in the middle part of California (the Great Valley) that
apparently have few earthquakes. We define this region as the “NonHaz” Region and,
in my empirical analysis, we use bank branches in this region to account for possible
effects of geographic diversification on the balance sheet structures and lending practices
of banks.5
We first use the method developed by Malmendier and Nagel (2011) and construct
the earthquake experience for each branch b at date t as a weighted average of its past
earthquake magnitudes. As shown in equation (1), the weighting scheme is determined
by the age of the branch at time t (ageit), the date of the earthquake (datet−k), the date
of establishment (estdateb), how long ago the earthquake took place (k), and a shaping
parameter λ.6 A decreasing weighting function (λ > 0) reflects that early earthquake
experiences fade away from the memory of the branch. An increasing weighting function
(λ < 0), on the contrary, means that early earthquake experiences can have greater influ-
ence on a bank’s current decision-making than recent ones. Mt−k denotes the earthquake
magnitude. We let Mt−k = 0 when the magnitude of the earthquake on datet−k is less
5One plausible explanation that the Great Valley region (especially its northern part) has fewer
earthquakes than the costal area is that it is relatively far away from the San Andreas Fault, a continental
transform fault that extends roughly 1,200 kilometers through California along the east coast.
6The term datet−k − estdateb represents how recent the earthquake is. A smaller value indicates an
early earthquake that happened shortly after the date of establishment; a larger value means that the
earthquake happened recently.
9
than 4, or when there was no earthquake; as a result, the branch’s earthquake experience
on that day is zero.7 We also exclude earthquakes happening just one quarter before the
current date t (i.e., we let k start at 90) to prevent any short-term effects of earthquakes
on asset structures and to ensure that banks really behave according to their long-term
earthquake experiences:
Ebt =
agebt−1∑
k=90
wbk(λ)Mt−k, (1)
where
wbk(λ) =
(datet−k − estdateb)λ
agebt−1∑
k=90
(agebt − k)λ
.
Whereas Malmendier and Nagel (2011) focus on an individual investor, the banks
in this study have multiple branches operating in different regions, and the earthquake
experiences of branches thus differ from each other. In view of this feature, a bank’s earth-
quake experience should eventually be an aggregate of the experiences of its branches.
We construct the bank-level earthquake experience by using a set of deposit weights. In
particular, as shown in equation (2), each branch b at time t takes a weight equal to the
proportion of its deposit in the total deposits of all branches.8 The underlying assump-
tion is that if a branch has a higher level of deposit, its headquarter bank consequently
attach greater importance to its experiences when making financial decisions. The de-
posit weight ωbt changes yearly because the deposit data are reported yearly. Finally, a
bank’s earthquake experience is the weighted average of branch experiences:
7Choosing the threshold of 4 implies that banks simply ignore weaker earthquakes. The threshold is
based on the effects of earthquakes described on the USGS website (https://earthquake.usgs.gov/
learn/topics/mag_vs_int.php). According to the description, earthquakes with magnitudes between
3.0 and 3.9 are felt quite noticeably by persons indoors, especially on upper floors of buildings. But many
people do not recognize it as an earthquake. In addition, earthquakes with magnitudes between 4.0 and
4.9 are felt indoors by many, outdoors by few during the day. At night, some awakened. Dishes, windows,
doors disturbed; walls make cracking sound. Sensation like heavy truck struck building. Standing
motorcars rocked noticeably. In my robustness checks, to further alleviate the concern about the ad hoc
threshold, we vary the threshold magnitude. The major inferences nevertheless hold.
8Strictly speaking, the branch notation b should have a subscript i to denote that the branch belongs to
bank i. We slightly abuse the notation to simplify my explanation, as long as the readers can understand.
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Eit =
Bit∑
b=1
ωbtEbt, (2)
where
ωbt =
depositbt
Bit∑
b=1
depositbt
.
Aggregating experiences from the branch level to the bank level changes my inter-
pretation of the shape parameter λ slightly. At the branch level, λ indicates how does
each branch memorize its past earthquakes. For example, a positive λ means that early
earthquake experiences fade away in the memory of the branch, and the higher the value
is, the faster the experiences grow faint. At the bank level, however, λ is the average
shape parameter of all the branches and to a certain degree can be interpreted as the
memorizing pattern of the headquarter bank.
Besides the aggregation process, another feature in my variable construction is that
the earthquake weight wbk changes daily. Thanks to the data precision, we obtain the
exact dates of earthquake and dates of branch establishment, while the filing times of
the Call Reports and HMDA records can be set to the last day of each quarter or year.
Specifying wbk on a daily basis improves the precision of the experience variable and
generates more variation within a quarter. The small cost is an increased calculation
time. For example, we need to calculate nearly 3,650 weights for a branch established 10
years ago.
2.2.2 Bank Variables
We use Call Reports and the SOD data to construct the following bank-specific variables.
Total assets measures bank size. ROA (net interest income/total assets of last quarter)
indicates, given the capital base, how profitable a bank can be. Imputed Interest rate
measures the cost of borrowing (for total loans, it equals total interest income/total loans
and leases; analogously, for real estate loans, it equals interest income on loans secured
by real estate/loans secured by real estate). NonHaz branch% measures the proportion
of branches of a bank in counties that are less prone to earthquakes. Specifically, we
manually outline counties of the “NonHaz” Region and divide the number of branches
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of a bank in this region by its total number of branches. Bank age is defined as the
difference between the date of observation and the date of establishment of a bank.
2.2.3 Regional Variables
My regressions include county-level macroeconomic and demographic variables. These
variables serve two major purposes. In the first part of my Results section, they are
treated as controls to account for the possibility that local conditions affect bank risk
taking. In the second part, we use them as dependent variables to explore how a county’s
current income level and residential composition is shaped by its historical disaster expe-
riences. We collect the median household income and poverty rate from the Census Bu-
reau, the unemployment rate from the website of Employment Development Department
of California, and the population and migration data from the website of Department of
Finance of California.
2.3 Summary Statistics
Table 1 reports summary statistics for my main variables. Panel A reports the statistics
for the full sample. However, to avoid the possibility that big banks can distort the
picture, Panel B restricts the sample to banks that have less than or equal to 3 branches.
Here, three is the median of the number of branches.
Comparing Panels A and B, we see that smaller banks tend to be younger than the
average bank, with a mean age of 12 years rather than 21 years. The comparison also
reveals that smaller banks are safer than the average bank as they maintain a higher
capital buffer, attract more deposits per branch, and lend to customers with a higher
income. The patterns are similar for the real estate loan ratio, ROA and interest rates.9
In my analyses, we control for total assets and the number of branches of every bank so
the effect of earthquake experiences is not confounded by bank size.
The real estate loan comprises the biggest part of banks’ balance sheets, averaging
44% of total assets, with a large standard deviation of 0.179. This suggests that the real
9The above conclusions are based on formal t-tests between banks with more than 3 branches and
banks with less than or equal to 3 branches.
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estate loan is a qualified measure of the riskiness of the overall portfolio of banks. Fur-
thermore, the average interest rate on real estate loans is 4.4% and has a small variation
across banks and over time. On the contrary, the average interest rate on all loans is
17%, with a standard deviation of 6.514, indicating that banks possess a diversified loan
portfolio and there were substantial changes in the benchmark interest rate over the past
years.
In the next section, we introduce how we estimate the effects of earthquake experi-
ences and discuss possible identification issues.
3 Estimation Method and Identification Strategy
To analyze the relationship between earthquake experiences and the risk taking of banks
measured from the perspective of balance sheet structure (real estate ratio and capital
ratio) and lending practice (borrower income and ethnicity), we primarily rely on the
following generic regression model:
yit = α + βEit(λ) + γ
′xit + it, (3)
where yit is one of my four risk-taking measures of bank i at time t, Eit is the earth-
quake experience of the bank, λ is the shape parameter that determines the slope of
the weighting scheme, and xit is a vector of control variables that includes bank charac-
teristics (total assets, ROA, imputed interest rates, bank age, number of branches, and
proportion of branches in less hazardous counties) and regional demographics (poverty
rate, population, and unemployment rate).
For each branch, the shape parameter λ determines the slope of the weighting func-
tion. A positive λ leads to a downward-sloping curve, meaning that the branch gradually
forgets early earthquakes and attach bigger weights to recent earthquakes. A negative
λ indicates an upward-sloping curve, meaning that early earthquakes have left vivid im-
pression to the branch. If λ is zero, then the branch weighs all earthquakes equally.
As shown in equation (1) and (2), Eit(λ) is constructed as a nonlinear function of the
unknown parameter λ. Thus to estimate β and λ simultaneously, nonlinear estimation
methods are needed. However, as the number of bank branches in my sample is huge and
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the unit of my earthquake weight (wbk) is daily, nonlinear methods prove to be exceedingly
time-consuming. To improve efficiency, we therefore first estimate the equation on a
tightly spaced grid of values for λ (step=0.02) and then use the λ and the estimates that
lead to the lowest residual sum of squares as my final estimated coefficients.10 In this
way, we effectively transform a nonlinear regression to several linear regressions by fixing
the value of λ in every regression.11
Despite the exogenous nature of earthquakes, my study still faces a few identification
issues.12 The first one is that earthquakes are not uniformly distributed within Califor-
nia. As shown in Figure 1, even though earthquakes are prevalent, a few counties in the
middle region (especially the northern part of the Great Valley) have significantly less
earthquakes than other counties. If banks deliberately choose to open more branches in
this “NonHaz” Region (as defined in the Data section), then we cannot judge whether
the current balance sheet structure and lending pattern are shaped by this geographical
diversification strategy or by the earthquake experiences of banks. By plotting the dis-
tribution of bank branches in Figure 2, we can already see that a considerable number
of branches are located in the “NonHaz” Region, so banks may have already considered
the earthquake hazards when locating their branches. To account for this confounding
factor, we calculate for each bank the portion of branches in less hazardous counties and
include this variable into my regression.
Another identification issue is related to outliers of earthquake experiences. In my
sample, a few big banks have accumulated high values of experiences because they are
old and have a large number of branches. We account for this issue by excluding the top
1% largest banks and by dropping extreme values of earthquake experiences (Eit ≥ 100).
We further control for bank ages and the number of branches of banks in my regressions.
10To put it more in detail, we first try values of λ’s with a step of 0.5. After finding the best value,
i.e. the value that yields the lowest residual sum of squares, we try values ±0.5 around this best value
with a step of 0.02 to pin down my final estimates of λ and other coefficients.
11This estimation method sacrifices the precision of λ, but reduces the running time of each of my
regression programs from more than seven days to less than seven hours.
12It is worth mentioning that a remarkable advantage of studying the effects of earthquakes is the
absence of reverse causality. In my case, the risk taking of banks can hardly be thought to cause
earthquakes.
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To control for the unobserved effect of the headquarter bank, we include dummies of
counties where the headquarters are located. Finally, we use year dummies to absorb any
unobservable aggregate macroeconomic factors that may affect bank risk taking.
4 Results
In this section, we present my main results on the effects of earthquake experiences
on bank risk taking. We find that banks with intense earthquake experiences adapt
their balance sheet structure to make themselves more resilient to defaults. Meanwhile,
these banks are significantly more prudent in their lending practices. We next explore
the channel linking earthquake experiences to bank risk taking and show that both the
market forces as well as the variations in banks’ own risk perceptions drive the risk-taking
patterns. We further present a battery of robustness tests showing that the main results
remain intact when increasing or decreasing the sample size.
4.1 Balance Sheet Structure
4.1.1 Real Estate Ratio
We start by linking the experienced earthquakes to the real estate ratio defined as the
ratio of loans secured by real estate to total assets. We choose the real estate ratio as an
important measure of bank risk taking because real estate loans account for the largest
part of total loans and are crucial for the financial stability of banks. Buildings are the
most important collateral for loans. As earthquakes can cause tremendous damage to
buildings, the real estate ratio measure is therefore especially relevant to my study.
The effect of earthquake experiences on the real estate ratio, however, is not obvious
at first glance. As explained before, on the one hand, by causing damages to buildings,
earthquakes not only trigger defaults of bank loans but also decrease the value of col-
lateral. Banks that repeatedly suffer from defaults can learn from such experiences and
subsequently reduce the issuance of real estate loans. On the other hand, earthquakes
create investment opportunities in the future, and therefore possibly increase the demand
for bank loans. Moreover, real estate loans may be affected by market conditions. For
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instance, residents with strong earthquake experiences may leave high-risk counties, caus-
ing decreases in both supply and demand of funds. Such market forces are explored in
the next subsection. Here it suffices to know the overall effect of earthquake experiences
on the real estate ratio.
The estimate of -0.219 for the coefficient β in column (iii) of Table 2 indicates a sig-
nificantly negative relationship between earthquake experiences and the real estate ratio.
To be more specific, the results imply that an increase in the earthquake experience from
its 10th percentile to its 90th percentile is associated with a decrease in real estate ratio
of 3.1 percent and a decrease in interest income of 4.9 percent.13 This differential effect
is economically moderate given the large proportion of real estate loans in total assets
(44 percent). However, since the results also reflect the opposite “rebuilding” effect, the
actual “experience” effect can be big. In addition, as shown in Figure 1, earthquakes are
quite evenly distributed across California, so the distribution of experiences is relatively
concentrated. For the whole world, natural disasters are not evenly distributed; therefore
the “experience” effect can play a significant role. Furthermore, if the disaster experi-
ence increases from its minimum to its maximum, the decrease in the real estate ratio is
about 46 percent. This huge difference convincingly underlines the non-negligible effects
of disaster experiences.
The value of 0.18 for the shape parameter λ corresponds to a weighting curve that is
almost flat. It means that although banks attach heavier weights to recent earthquakes,
old experiences do not easily fade away from their memory. Compared with the values
estimated by Malmendier and Nagel (2011, 2015) for individuals’ experiences on stock re-
turns and inflation, the value in my study is quite low. This indicates that institutions do
not quickly forget past experiences and may respond less promptly to recent experiences
than individuals do.
We have included various bank-specific variables in the regression model. Among
them, the NonHaz branch% is of identification importance because it measures how the
13We evaluate this differential effect (i.e. the difference between the fitted real estate ratios at the 10th
and 90th percentiles of the earthquake experience) at the sample means of the data. The results are the
same if we evaluate the differential effects at every observation and obtain the sample average of the
individual differential effects.
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geographic diversification strategy affects the balance sheet structure. My results point
out that banks having more branches in disaster-prone counties maintain less real estate
loans. This is not surprising given that – as will be explained latter – the demands for
real estate loans in these counties are low.
4.1.2 Capital Ratio
Unlike the real estate ratio that is partially affected by the supply and demand forces
of the market, the capital ratio is mainly determined by the bank on its own and is
therefore a more direct risk-taking measure commonly used in the literature (Thakor,
2014; Bouwman and Malmendier, 2015). In a study on a microfinance institution in Peru,
Collier (2014) found that the lender increased its capital ratio during the 1998 El Nin˜o
to endure disaster-related default risk. In line with this reasoning, in order to protect
them from default risks, banks that frequently suffer from disasters may continuously
keep a higher capital ratio than banks that have experienced less disasters. To test this
hypothesis, Table 3 presents regression results of the effect of earthquake experiences on
the capital ratios of California banks.
The capital ratio is significantly negatively related to the earthquake experience,
which means banks with stronger earthquake experiences eventually become more cau-
tious than banks with fewer experiences. Specifically, going from the 10th to the 90th
percentile of experiences in column (i) implies, on average, an increase in the capital ra-
tio of 0.2 percent, or equivalently, 265 thousand dollars. The economic magnitude of this
differential effect, however, is small compared to the standard deviation for the capital
ratio of 11.2 percent.14 The results do not change after adding new explanatory variables.
Besides using additional capital to absorb losses induced by defaults, banks can
manage their default risks ex ante. Theories have predicted that banks with higher
capital are able to engage in more costly screening and monitoring activities (Holmstrom
14The current analysis does not consider the heterogeneity in experiences. However, in subsection 4.5,
we find banks at the bottom decile of the earthquake experience reduce their capital ratio significantly,
with a differential effect of -1.1 percent. Meanwhile, the standard deviation of the capital ratio is 2.8
percent. This finding implies that having very low earthquake exposure can significantly increase a
bank’s risk taking.
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and Tirole, 1997; Mehran and Thakor, 2011) and therefore are more likely to lend funds to
low-income borrowers. Does the increased equity help banks to lend more to low-income
residents? Otherwise, do banks switch to high-income borrowers so as to better endure
losses rendered by the upcoming disasters? The balance sheet structure, nonetheless,
cannot tell us which effect is dominant. To explore this issue, we look at the lending
preferences of banks in my next subsection.
4.2 Lending Preferences
4.2.1 Borrower Income
If banks with stronger experiences use their additional capital to enhance their moni-
toring, we expect to see a negative relationship between earthquake experiences and the
average income of borrowers. But if disasters lead banks to be circumspect in lending, we
expect a positive relationship. To explore which effect dominates, we rely on the HMDA
dataset containing the yearly borrower income that we use as a proxy for borrower credit
quality.
The results in Table 4 point to a significantly positive relationship between earth-
quake experiences and the borrower income, which means banks become more willingly
to lend to borrowers with good credit quality after experiencing more earthquakes. The
economic effect of this finding is significant: An increase rise of the disaster experience
variable from its 10th percentile to its 90th percentile corresponds to an increase in average
borrower income of 69 thousand dollars.15 Such a change in the borrower composition
deserves due attention from policy makers: As will be elaborated in the later subsec-
15Note in this regression we did not include the dummies for counties for the following reasons: First,
the county dummies do not have a strong economic interpretation because the experience variable is an
aggregate of experiences of branches that are located across several counties. The “headquarter effects”
in the previous analyses is merely a far-fetched interpretation; second, controlling for them leads to
poorly fitted model with negative adjusted R-squared value, high p-value, and insignificant coefficients
for all variables, including the constant. In this view, we dropped these dummies of ambiguous economic
meanings. Another potential identification issue is that high-income consumers may select big, renowned
banks. We handle this issue by excluding all banks with more than $2 billion total assets in the robustness
test. Inferences about the relation between bank risk taking and disaster experience continue to hold in
this smaller sample.
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tion, in the past decades counties with higher earthquake risks have witnessed an inflow
of low-income households and an outflow of rich families. By inducing banks to adjust
their borrower composition, disasters impose credit restrictions on low-income people who
come to rebuild cities undergoing costly damages (Elliott, 2014). Such an inefficiency in
credit rationing can slowdown a recovery.
4.2.2 Borrower Race
Besides income levels, borrowers’ racial composition is another measure of inequality.
When banks have a subjective bias toward ethnic minorities, they may choose to reduce
lending after being made more conservative by disaster experiences. And indeed, one of
the purposes of the HMDA dataset is to monitor possibly discriminatory lending patterns
in banks. As has been shown in the previous studies using the HMDA dataset, the
inequality issue exists in the lending to different ethnic groups (Avery et al., 2005).
My results in Table 5, nevertheless, show that there is no link between earthquake
experiences and the proportion of minority borrowers. Apparently, no news is good news.
The results, however, should be generalized carefully because we am only examining banks
in California, a state well known for its ethnic diversity.
4.3 The Effects of Earthquake Experiences on Market Forces
In the preceding part, we provide evidence showing the significant impact of earthquake
experiences on banks’ balance sheet structure and lending preferences. For the sake of
generality, we address all the dependent variables as “risk-taking measures.” But in fact,
except for the capital ratio that is commonly used as a measure of bank risk taking
(Collier, 2014; Bouwman and Malmendier, 2015; Thakor, 2014), both the real estate loan
and borrower composition reflect to a great extent the external market forces. Notably,
unlike individuals, banks need to absorb deposits from the market and are obliged to
provide liquidity to support the economy. In this view, examining changes in the market
forces associated with disaster experiences is not only compelling, but is also necessary.
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4.3.1 Market Forces and the Real Estate Ratio
For the banking sector, market forces inherently contain two elements: The supply of
deposits and the demand for loans. In this subsection, we show that earthquake experi-
ences lead to a shortfall in branch deposits, contributing to the decrease in the real estate
ratio.
We obtain the deposit data from the SOD dataset of the FDIC. Now that the data are
at the branch level, we no longer aggregate and can simply use equation (1) to construct
the earthquake experience for each branch. The regression results on the impact of
earthquake experiences on deposits are presented in column (i) of Table 6. The results
show that branches with stronger earthquake experiences witness a significant decrease
in their deposits. The economic magnitude of this differential effect is moderate: A
change from the 10th to the 90th percentile of earthquake experiences is associated with
a decrease in deposits of 314 thousand dollars in a bank branch. This finding confirms
that the decrease in the real estate ratio is related the shortfall of deposits.16
But what are the reasons for the decline in deposits? Do economic and/or demo-
graphic conditions play a role? To find the answer, we examine the impact of earthquake
experiences on the median household income of California counties. Exploring the county-
level income data nevertheless requires the construction of county-level experiences. The
procedure is analogous except we now use the date of incorporation to represent the date
of establishment of the county.17 The results indicate a significantly negative relationship
between earthquake experience and household income. Based on the estimates reported
in column (ii) of Table 6, an increase in the earthquake experience from its 10th percentile
to its 90th percentile implies a decrease in income of 51 dollars for each household. This
finding shows that over the years, earthquakes have driven rich people to migrate out of
the county and poor people to move in. The decrease of deposits is thus the consequence
16As savings determine banks’ budget constraint, it is easy to understand that the deposit and the
level of real estate loan are positively related. But the link between deposit and the ratio is less clear.
To fulfill my logic circle, in Figure 4 in the appendix, we confirm a positive relationship between deposit
and real estate ratio using a scatter plot. Therefore, as deposits drop, the ratio also decreases.
17In the current context, incorporation means that a county has legally become or formed to be a
political entity of California.
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of the changes in the income structure.18
Disregarding the clear evidence above, one may be concerned that such a decrease
in deposits is driven by the decrease of the overall population of the county, but not by
the changes in income structure. We do not find this to be the case in my tests of the
effects of experiences on migration. The results in column (iii) and (iv) of Table 6 show
that the impact is neither significant for net migration nor for net domestic migration,
thus allaying the concern of the decrease of the overall population being a confounding
factor. Moreover, in line with the sociological literature on the relationship between
natural hazards and residential mobility (Pais and Elliott, 2008; Schultz and Elliott,
2013), my results assert that disasters act both as an environmental “push” and “pull”.
Especially, rather than focusing on the immediate effects of disasters (Elliott, 2014; Pais
and Elliott, 2008), we contribute to the literature by exploring the long-term effects of a
series of events. So far we can conclude that disaster experiences cause wealthier people
to migrate out of the county and poorer people to move in. In this way, low-income
people increase their job opportunities by helping the recovery but at the cost of facing
more future hazards.
As a complement, we examine whether the demand for loans are affected by natural
disaster experiences using the HMDA data. The HMDA data provide the “loan amount”
for every bank branch in the period 2010 to 2015. Again, the key explanatory variable is
the county-level earthquake experience. We construct the dependent variable through
averaging the loan amount across each bank’s branches in every county. Results in
column (v) of Table 6 indicate an insignificant relationship between the demand for loans
and the earthquake experience, with a negative shape parameter. The effect remains
insignificant even if we fix the shape parameter to a positive value (column (vi)). This
finding further confirms that rebuilding activities do happen after disasters and thus
stimulate the demand for loans. Further, as illustrated in the distribution map before,
earthquakes are frequent in developed costal regions. Although they are prone to natural
18One reasonable concern is that higher income level may not lead to more bank deposit because,
instead of saving, rich families can invest in various financial assets such as bonds, stocks, and mutual
funds. To bridge the link between household income and deposit level, we draw a scatter plot in Figure 5
in the appendix. The figure confirms that high median household income is related to high deposit level.
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hazards, these regions have a strong ability of attracting various types of businesses, so
the demands for funds are less likely to fall.
In sum, besides banks, markets and residents also learn from their disaster experi-
ences. Specifically, rich families living in counties with stronger earthquake hazard learn
from their experiences and migrate to safer places. Such change in the demographic
structure consequently brings down the deposit level, contributing to the decrease in real
estate loans of banks in those counties.
It is worth pausing a moment to reflect the channels linking disasters to bank deci-
sion making. In general, there are two routes: The first is the “learning from experience”
channel that is psychological and relates to behavior finance; the second is the “market
forces” channel that is more mechanical and has a general equilibrium taste. The special
features of the banking sector determine the importance of these two channels. By ab-
sorbing and lending funds, banks interact closely with local markets, and their practices
largely reflect the market conditions. Thus, while disasters can alter the risk attitude of
banks, they can also change the market conditions, especially in the long-term. Therefore,
while papers on individual decision-making can easily reach the conclusion that disasters
affect the risk attitudes of investors through the “learning channel” (Malmendier and
Nagel, 2011, 2015; Bernile et al., 2017), my paper must carefully evaluate both channels.
So far, though we have pointed out the role of market forces in affecting the real estate
ratio, we cannot exclude the learning channel because doing so will require specific data
such as surveys of bankers. Therefore, the conclusion is that both channels can exist.
However, as is discussed in the next subsection, we validate the “learning” channel in the
change of borrower income by showing that market forces play no role.
4.3.2 Market Forces and the Borrower Income
In the previous subsection, we find banks with stronger earthquake experiences tend to
lend to high-income borrowers. At that moment we resisted the temptation of concluding
that banks are made conservative by their disaster experiences, for the change in borrower
composition may be related to the change in local income structure. Indeed, by exploring
the market forces, we find that counties with higher earthquake hazards witness a decrease
in median household income. Nevertheless, in line with the “market forces” channel we
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may still be concerned that banks follow high-income borrowers to “migrate” (i.e. switch
their activities) to less hazardous regions. This hypothesis is easy to reject.
Results in Table 6 already show that counties with stronger earthquake experiences
do not witness a decrease in loan demand. In this subsection, we go a step further by
examining what types of loans are likely to happen in less hazardous counties. Doing
so naturally requires the binary choice regression model. Specifically, we use the HMDA
data and denote 1 if the county is in the less hazardous region, as defined in Section 2, and
0 otherwise. The three loan characters are loan amount, borrower income, and borrower
race. Results shown in Table 7 are based on the linear probability model, the probit
model, and the logit model respectively.19
The results point out a significantly negative relationship between the county indi-
cator and the loan amount and a significantly positive relationship between the county
indicator and the borrower income. Thus, although high-income borrowers are more likely
to live in less risky counties, they do not necessarily borrow more. On the contrary, it is
the more hazardous (costal) regions that demand more loans to support their economic
development. Last but not least, the results in Table 7 resonate with my previous findings
that low-income borrowers migrate to riskier regions. For example, besides showing that
rich people concentrate in less hazardous regions, the significantly negative coefficients for
“nonwhite applicant” also indicate that nonwhite residents tend to live in disaster-prone
regions.
In short, this subsection excludes the link between market forces and the borrower
income level of banks. At this moment, we can confirm that the increase in borrower in-
come for banks with stronger earthquake experiences is because these banks have become
more conservative after learning from their experiences.
19Estimates in columns (ii) to (vii) are based on the randomly selected subsamples (1% full sample)
because the huge number of observations in the full sample implies too few variations in the data and
prevents the probit and logit models from converging. To show that the results are robust to the selection
of subsamples, we run three regressions for each probit and logit model.
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4.4 Robustness
In this subsection, we carry out a series of tests to evaluate the robustness of my baseline
analyses and basic inferences.
4.4.1 Different Thresholds for Selecting Earthquakes
The first robustness test is related to the concern about the ad hoc threshold used for
selecting earthquakes. As discussed in Section 2, an earthquake is included in my sample
for the baseline analyses if it has a magnitude no less than 4, which means that we
implicitly posit that banks ignore earthquakes weaker than this magnitude. To ensure the
robustness of my major inferences, in Table 8, we estimate the models using two different
thresholds (magnitude=2.5 and 5), which presumes that banks ignore earthquakes weaker
than 2.5 (and 5).20 To save the time of estimation, we fix the values of the shape
parameters at their previously estimated values in column (iii)’s of Tables 2, 3, and 4.
The results in Table 8 are largely congruent with the results in my baseline analyses.
First, the differential effects remain unchanged. For example, the results indicate that
a spread between the 10th and the 90th percentile of disaster experiences generates a
change in real estate ratio of about 2 percent. Second, the results imply that a one
standard deviation increase in the earthquake experience is associated with a decrease
in real estate ratio of about 1 percent.21 The results, however, are distinct in terms of
their values of the coefficient β: As the threshold rises, the coefficient value also increases
significantly. This evidence is attributed to the construction of the experience variable:
As the threshold rises, the branch-level experience becomes zero for weaker earthquakes
and the distribution of the experiences becomes more concentrated. The value of the
estimate therefore increases.
20By choosing the threshold=2.5, we effectively include all earthquakes in my data, for 2.5 is the lowest
magnitude in the USGS dataset. According to the description on the USGS website, earthquakes with
magnitudes between 1.0 and 3.0 are not felt except by a very few under especially favorable conditions.
21The effects of “one standard deviation in experience” are evaluated during running the programs
and are not reported.
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4.4.2 High-Income Borrowers Prefer Large Banks
In my baseline analyses, we show that banks having stronger disaster experiences tend
to extend their funds to high-income borrowers. This conclusion, however, can be dis-
credited by a potential reverse-causality problem: In order to obtain more advanced
financial services, high-income borrowers are likely to choose large banks. These banks
have stronger earthquake experiences due to their large number of branches and long
operating histories. This mechanism could lead to spurious effects of banks’ disaster
experiences on the borrower income level.
We address such concern in two ways. First, my previous tests control for the bank
size variables (e.g. total assets and number of branches). Since these controls are highly
positively correlated with the experience variables, by including them, we largely mitigate
the omitted-variable problem. Second, to further allay the reverse-causality concern, we
exclude all banks with assets above $2 billion from my sample. The results presented by
Table 9 show that my main inferences are unchanged.
4.4.3 Rescale the Magnitude
In my earthquake data, the Richter Scale is used to measure the magnitudes of earth-
quakes. It is a base-10 logarithmic scale. For example, an earthquake with a magnitude
of 5 has a shaking amplitude ten times greater than an earthquake of magnitude 4. In
the previous analyses, for simplicity reason, we treated the scale to be linear. In this ro-
bustness test, we rescale the magnitudes by taking the natural and base-10 exponentials
for magnitudes respectively. Panel A and B in Table 10 report the results. By fixing the
shaping parameter values, the differential effects remain intact in Panel A while almost
halves in Panel B.22
22Please notice that in this robustness check, we fix the values of the shaping parameters. As taking
the base-10 exponentials can greatly increase the magnitude of bigger earthquakes, the actual shaping
parameters are likely to be smaller. For example, when the shaping parameter in the real estate ratio
regression is 0.05 instead of 0.18, then the differential effect becomes -0.037.
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4.5 Can Disasters Make Banks More Risk-Loving?
Thus far, we have shown that stronger disaster experiences lead banks to reduce the real
estate loan level, boost their capital adequacy, and lend to high-income borrowers. These
relationships, however, are implicitly presumed to be monotonic. But one might suspect
that banks that continuously survive from moderate disasters may believe that they are
resilient to adverse events and thus become overconfident. This concern echoes with
the recent findings by Bernile et al. (2017) who show that CEOs with moderate early-
life natural disaster experiences are more willing to make riskier financial decisions than
CEOs whose experiences are at the low and high extremes. To explore such a dimension
of heterogeneity in the banking sector, we classify banks into ten groups by the deciles of
their earthquake experiences and analyze each subsample, fixing the shape parameter λ
at their previously estimated values. Figure 3 shows the estimated effects of earthquakes
(β) and their t-statistics for each decile group.
The figure demonstrates a few things. Specifically, we find banks who are the least
exposed to earthquakes tend to extend a significantly larger amount of real estate loans
and maintain a lower level of capital. For instance, for banks in the bottom decile
group, increasing the experience from its 10th percentile to its 90th percentile leads to
a decrease in capital ratio of about 1.1 percent. Given that the standard deviation of
the capital ratio is 2.8 percent for these banks, the economic magnitude is sizable. This
means that banks that experienced very few fatal disasters are more risk-loving than
banks whose disaster experiences are stronger. However, as the earthquake experiences
accumulate, banks reduce their real estate loans, increase the capital adequacy, and
finally invert the relationship. In contrast to Bernile et al. (2017), my plots show an
almost monotonic relationship between disaster experiences and measures of bank risk
taking. These two pieces of evidence are not easily compared because the samples and
the measures of disaster experiences are so different. But at least both indicate that the
beliefs of decision-makers about future risks depend heavily on the disaster intensity.
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5 Conclusion
This paper studies the relationship between disaster experiences and the business prac-
tices of banks. California offers an ideal setting for identification. It has a comprehensive
record of earthquakes dating back to the 18th century and its socio-economic variables are
easy to access. Exploiting the completeness of the data, we manage to identify the long-
term impacts of disaster experiences on balance sheet structure and lending preference
and to explore the evolution of market forces underlying such changes.
We find banks with bigger earthquake exposures throughout their lives tend to issue
less real estate loans, increase the equity level, and are more likely to lend to high-income
borrowers. My empirical results show that an increase in the earthquake experience from
its 10th percentile to its 90th percentile leads to a decrease in real estate ratio of about
3.1 percent and an increase in average borrower income of around 69 thousand dollars.
Fortunately we do not find evidence that strong earthquake experiences lead banks to
become more discriminated against ethnic minorities.
Banks interact closely with local markets, so both the subjective risk taking and the
external market forces determine their loan quantity and borrower composition. With
the assistance of my detailed data, we confirm that both channels exist. First, counties
that frequently experience earthquakes in their history witness an outflow (inflow) of rich
(poor) households and consequently a decrease in income level. As a result, deposits in
bank branches drop, tightening the budget constraint and contributing to the shrinkage
in risky loans. These results thus point to a general equilibrium channel. Second, despite
that rich families migrate to risk-prone counties, banks did not follow on to switch their
activities. As a matter of fact, most lending activities concentrate in riskier regions,
perhaps due to the strong demand for funds of the costal area. The increased borrower
income therefore is not led by changes in market forces but is mostly related to banks
learning from disaster experiences.
My main results remain stable under a battery of robustness tests. In particular,
the test designed to explore the heterogeneous effects of disaster experiences reveals that
banks with extremely small disaster exposure become risk-loving. But as experiences
accumulate, the dependent variables alter monotonically and the risk attitude inverts.
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Though my results are robust and statistically significant, the economic magnitude is
on average modest. This is not necessarily a defect as we have pointed out and tested the
various forces, many of which are in opposite direction, that drive my measures of balance
sheet structure and lending preferences. Meanwhile, when we calculate the differential ef-
fects using the maximum and minimum values of the experience, the economic magnitude
appears large. Since disasters are highly unevenly distributed over the world, the effects
of disaster experiences on financial systems of different countries will be non-negligible.
Finally, the positive yet near-zero values of the shape parameter imply an almost flat
memorizing curve of disasters. Therefore, even shocks happened far back in the past do
not fade away easily and still influence current financial decisions. Moreover, compared
with the values of the shape parameter estimated in Malmendier and Nagel (2011, 2015),
those in my paper are even lower, indicating that institutions retain longer memories
than individuals do. In view of the long-lasting effect of shocks and the intermediate role
of the banking sector, building a general equilibrium learning model to account for the
long-term influence of disasters is a tenable future endeavor.
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Table 1: Key Statistics
This table summarizes descriptive statistics for the variables used in my baseline regressions. The sample includes my four
measures of bank risk taking. The capital ratio and real estate loan ratio are based on Call Report data from 1994Q1 to
2013Q4. They measure risk taking from the perspective of balance sheet structure. The borrower income and borrower
race are based on HMDA data from 2010 to 2013. They measure risk taking from the aspect of bank lending preference.
Branch deposit and branch number are from the Summary of Deposits of FDIC. NonHaz branch% indicates the proportion
of branches of a bank in counties less prone to earthquakes. Bank age is the age of the headquarter bank. Poverty data are
from the U.S. Census Bureau. Unemployment rate and population are from websites of the California government. Panel
A includes data for all banks. To exclude the effects of big banks, Panel B restricts the sample to banks with less than or
equal to 3 branches.
Standard 10th 90th
Average Deviation Percentile Percentile Observations
Panel A: Full Sample
Bank variables
Real estate loan ratio 0.440 0.179 0.216 0.669 20368
Capital ratio 0.127 0.112 0.070 0.185 19334
Borrower income ($ thousands) 320.688 379.76 90 705.63 307
Borrower race% 0.218 0.325 0 0.903 307
Total assets ($ billions) 2.744 36.750 0.044 1.375 20368
ROA 0.027 0.016 0.010 0.047 19817
Imputed Rate Total 0.170 6.514 0.023 0.119 19650
ImputedInt Rate RE Loan 0.044 0.048 0.016 0.074 13190
Deposit ($ millions) 72.044 338.996 17.567 110.597 5181
Bank age (years) 21.108 24.202 2.778 40.844 20368
NonHaz branch% 0.090 0.262 0 0.333 20021
Branch number 13.257 71.547 1 15 20021
Regional variables
Unemployment% 9.136 0.045 5.7 11.6 4640
Poverty% 14.672 4.956 10.8 18.1 1102
Population (thousands) 606 1365 45 620 1160
Panel B: Banks with Branch Number ≤ 3
Bank variables
Real estate loan ratio 0.430 0.187 0.185 0.661 10751
Capital ratio 0.142 0.130 0.070 0.224 10522
Borrower income ($ thousands) 376.638 443.424 84 893.833 139
Borrower race% 0.190 0.328 0 0.9 139
Total assets ($ billions) 0.220 1.256 0.035 0.268 10751
ROA 0.027 0.015 0.010 0.046 10469
Imputed Rate Total 0.152 3.041 0.024 0.124 10311
ImputedInt Rate RE Loan 0.043 0.066 0.016 0.069 6103
Deposit ($ millions) 78.524 444.127 15.705 120.835 2748
Bank age (years) 12.414 13.361 1.704 24.008 10751
NonHaz branch% 0.071 0.250 0 0 10751
Branch number 1.852 0.804 1 3 10751
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Table 2: Disaster Experiences Decrease Banks’ Exposure to Real Estate
This table reports regression estimates of real estate ratios from 1994Q1 to 2013Q4 on earthquake experiences of banks and
a variety of banking and regional variables (poverty percent, population, and unemployment rate). The real estate ratio is
based on Call Reports and is defined as the proportion of a bank’s real estate loan to its total assets. The regional variables
control for the macroeconomic and demographic conditions of counties that can affect the demand for real estate loans.
The poverty percent, population, and unemployment rate are from the U.S. Census Bureau, the Employment Development
Department of California, and the Department of Finance of California respectively. We estimate the model on a tightly
spaced grid of values of the weighting parameter λ (step=0.02), and select the estimates resulting in the lowest residual
sum of squares to be the final estimated coefficients. The standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are reported in
parentheses. The weighting parameters are shown in the first row. All the regressions control for year fixed effects.
(i) (ii) (iii)
Weighting parameter λ 0.26 0.18 0.18
Earthquake experience coefficient β -0.219 -0.218 -0.219
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
NonHaz branch% -0.110 -0.107
(0.020) (0.020)
Branch number 1.017×10−5
(2.028×10−5)
Bank-level controls Yes Yes Yes
Regional controls Yes Yes Yes
Headquarter fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Average of actual value at 90th pct. minus actual value -0.031 -0.031 -0.031
at 10th pct. of earthquake experience
Average of fitted value at maximum minus fitted value -0.461 -0.458 -0.461
at minimum of earthquake experience
R-squared 0.481 0.476 0.474
Observations 10625 10597 10545
Number of banks 415 415 415
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Table 3: Disaster Experiences Boost Banks’ Capital Adequacy
This table reports results of estimating regressions of bank capital ratios from 1994Q1 to 2013Q4 on earthquake experiences
and a variety of bank-specific variables (total assets, ROA, imputed interest rate, real estate loan, portion of branches in
less hazardous regions, number of branches, and bank age). The dependent variable, capital ratio, is based on Call Reports.
It equals the ratio of total equity to GTA, where GTA is total assets plus the allowance for loan and lease losses plus the
allocated transfer risk reserve. Data for bank branches are from the SOD dataset of FDIC. To construct the earthquake
experience variable for each bank, we match the earthquakes and bank branches by their counties of occurrence/location
and then aggregate branch-level experiences to bank-level experiences based on the deposit amounts of branches. All other
bank variables are from the Call Reports. All other variables are as defined in Table 2. We estimate the model on a
tightly spaced grid of values of the weighting parameter λ (step=0.02), and select the estimates resulting in the lowest
residual sum of squares to be the final estimated coefficients. The standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are reported
in parentheses. The weighting parameters are shown in the first row. The NonHaz branch% and Branch number are of
identification importance and are thus tabulated explicitly. All the regressions control for year fixed effects.
(i) (ii) (iii)
Weighting parameter λ 0.24 0.30 0.28
Earthquake experience coefficient β 0.008 0.006 0.007
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
NonHaz branch% 0.011 0.012
(0.004) (0.004)
Branch number 9.476×10−5
(3.434×10−5)
Bank-level controls Yes Yes Yes
Headquarter fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Average of actual value at 90th pct. minus actual value 0.002 0.002 0.002
at 10th pct. of earthquake experience
Average of fitted value at maximum minus fitted value 0.046 0.046 0.046
at minimum of earthquake experience
R-squared 0.240 0.238 0.237
Observations 16473 16473 16473
Number of banks 464 464 464
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Table 4: Disaster Experiences Trigger Flight-to-Quality of Banks
This table reports estimates of regressions of the income of borrowers on earthquake experiences of banks and a series of
bank- and regional-specific variables. The time horizon is 2010 to 2013. We first collect the income of individual borrowers
from the HMDA dataset and then calculate the yearly average of the borrower income for each bank and use it as the
dependent variable. All other explanatory variables are as defined in Table 2. We estimate the model on a tightly spaced
grid of values of the weighting parameter λ (step=0.02), and select the estimates resulting in the lowest residual sum of
squares to be the final estimated coefficients. The standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are reported in parentheses.
The weighting parameters are shown in the first row. All the regressions control for year fixed effects.
(i) (ii) (iii)
Weighting parameter λ 1.16 1.16 1.24
Earthquake experience coefficient β 602.318 657.936 592.535
(250.450) (269.318) (252.941)
NonHaz branch% 53.658 56.862
(55.099) (56.967)
Branch number% -1.511
(2.028)
Bank-level controls Yes Yes Yes
Regional controls Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Average of fitted value at 90th pct. minus fitted value 65.866 71.948 68.832
at 10th pct. of earthquake experience
Average of fitted value at maximum minus fitted value 368.857 402.917 390.313
at minimum of earthquake experience
R-squared 0.193 0.189 0.178
Observations 280 280 280
Number of banks 112 112 112
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Table 5: No Significant Impact on Borrower Race
This table reports estimates of regressions of the portion of non-white borrowers on earthquake experiences of banks and
a series of bank- and regional-specific variables. The time horizon is 2010 to 2013. We first collect the information of
borrower race from the HMDA dataset and then calculate the portion of non-white borrowers for each bank and use it
as the dependent variable. All other explanatory variables are as defined in Table 2. We estimate the model on a tightly
spaced grid of values of the weighting parameter λ (step=0.02), and select the estimates resulting in the lowest residual
sum of squares to be the final estimated coefficients. The standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are reported in
parentheses. The weighting parameters are shown in the first row. All the regressions control for year fixed effects.
(i) (ii) (iii)
Weighting parameter λ -0.04 -0.12 -0.12
Earthquake experience coefficient β -0.270 -0.232 -0.301
(0.474) (0.555) (0.581)
NonHaz branch% 0.008 0.008
(0.044) (0.045)
Branch number% -0.001
(0.002)
Bank-level controls Yes Yes Yes
Regional controls Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Average of fitted value at 90th pct. minus fitted value -0.012 -0.010 -0.014
at 10th pct. of earthquake experience
Average of fitted value at maximum minus fitted value -0.052 -0.041 -0.053
at minimum of earthquake experience
R-squared 0.510 0.479 0.464
Observations 280 280 280
Number of banks 112 112 112
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Table 6: The Effects of Earthquake Experiences on Deposits, Demographics,
and Loan Demands
This table reports the effects of earthquake experiences on branch deposit, median household income, net migration, net
domestic migration, and branch average loan amount respectively. The time horizon is 1994 to 2013 for the first four
variables and 2010 to 2015 for the last variable. The purpose of this table is to explore the channel between the real estate
loans and the supply/demand of funds of banks. The branch deposit is from the SOD dataset and represents the amount of
deposit for each bank branch. The three demographic variables are at the county level. Median household income is from
the U.S. Census Bureau. Net migration and net domestic migration are from the Department of Finance of California. The
loan amount variable is at the bank-county level; the data come from the HMDA. The estimation method is as explained in
the previous regressions. The standard errors reported in column (i) are robust to heteroscedasticity. Using robust errors
for other regressions will cause Matlab to report problem message (iteration limit); this is because the values of some the
explain variables are too close to each other. Since the standard errors for the insignificant β’s are so large that they will
remain so even if we scale the data and apply the robust errors, we simply use the non-robust standard errors for these
regressions. The weighting parameters are shown in the first row. All the regressions control for county fixed effects and
year fixed effects.
Branch Median Net Net Domestic HMDA Loan
Deposit Income Migration Migration Amount
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Weighting parameter λ 1.60 4.06 1.54 3.54 -1.62 2.0
[fixed]
Experience coefficient β -0.430 -0.900 14.258 2.397 -71.520 0.155
(0.105) (0.530) (18.398) (2.961) (364.128) (2.790)
Branch-level controls Yes - - - - -
Regional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Difference in fitted value at 90th -0.314 -0.051 0.615 0.129 -0.005 0.006
and at 10th pct.
Difference in fitted value at max -42.714 -4.181 6.423 6.770 -0.634 0.015
and at min
Number of branches 2960
Number of banks 549 35 35
R-squared 0.077 0.966 0.478 0.738 0.539 0.539
Observations 33576 1057 1057 1057 220 220
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Table 7: Banks Did Not Increase Lending in Less Hazardous Regions
This table reports results of estimating binary choice regressions of “NonHaz” Region from 2010 to 2015. All variables are
from the HMDA dataset. The dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the county is in the less hazardous region,
as defined in Section 2, and 0 otherwise. Loan amount is the dollar amount granted to an individual loan applicant by a
bank branch; nonwhite applicant is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the loan applicant is nonwhite; and applicant income
is the yearly income of the borrower. We use the linear probability model, the probit model, and the logit model. Column
(i) reports results of the linear probability model based on the full sample. Estimates in the rest of the columns are based
on the randomly selected subsamples (1% full sample) because the huge number of observations in the full sample implies
too few variations in the data and prevents the probit and logit models from converging. For each probit and logit model,
we run three regressions to show that the results are robust to the selection of subsamples. The standard errors robust to
heteroscedasticity are reported in parentheses. All the regressions control for the year fixed effects.
Linear Probit Logit
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
Loan amount -0.137 -2.350 -2.436 -2.251 -4.943 -4.809 -4.663
(0.001) (0.071) (0.078) (0.084) (0.131) (0.145) (0.134)
Applicant income 0.020 0.078 0.118 0.188 0.266 0.144 0.001
(0.001) (0.068) (0.063) (0.061) (0.112) (0.161) (0.101)
Nonwhite applicant -0.022 -0.117 -0.085 -0.075 -0.124 -0.209 -0.155
(0.000) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.023 0.078 0.081 0.071 0.081 0.079 0.076
Observations 4,249,491 42,495 42,495 42,495 42,495 42,495 42,495
38
Table 8: Robustness: Changing the Thresholds for Selecting Earthquakes
This table reports estimates of regressions of dependent variables (given in column titles) using the fully specified models
in Tables 2, 3, and 4. To reduce the estimation time, we fix the shape parameter λ at their previous values estimated with
the full specifications. In Panel A, we include earthquakes with magnitudes greater or equal to 2.5. In Panel B, we confine
the earthquake sample to events with magnitudes greater or equal to 5. All corresponding controls and fixed effects from
Tables 2, 3, and 4 are included by not shown for brevity. The standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are reported in
parentheses.
Capital ratio Real estate ratio Borrower income
(i) (ii) (iii)
Panel A: Magnitude≥2.5
Weighting parameter λ 0.28 0.18 1.24
[fixed] [fixed] [fixed]
Earthquake experience coefficient β 3.325×10−4 -0.010 32.072
(0.000) (0.001) (12.155)
Average of actual value at 90th pct. minus actual value 0.002 -0.026 75.733
at 10th pct. of earthquake experience
Average of fitted value at maximum minus fitted value 0.046 -0.379 395.977
at minimum of earthquake experience
Panel B: Magnitude≥5
Weighting parameter λ 0.28 0.18 1.24
[fixed] [fixed] [fixed]
Earthquake experience coefficient β 0.063 -1.071 807.470
(0.009) (0.124) (1512.808)
Average of actual value at 90th pct. minus actual value 0.002 -0.022 13.671
at 10th pct. of earthquake experience
Average of fitted value at maximum minus fitted value 0.046 -0.293 73.195
at minimum of earthquake experience
Bank-level controls Yes Yes Yes
Regional controls No Yes Yes
Headquarter fixed effects Yes Yes No
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10625 10595 10545
Number of banks 415 415 415
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Table 9: Robustness: Borrower Credit Quality (Excluding Large Banks)
This table reports estimates of regressions of the income of borrowers on earthquake experiences of banks and a series of
bank- and regional-specific variables. The time horizon is 2010 to 2013. We first collect the income of individual borrowers
from the HMDA dataset and then calculate the yearly average of the borrower income for each bank and use it as the
dependent variable. To address the potential reverse-causality concern, we exclude all banks with assets above $2 billion
from my sample. We fix the shape parameter λ at their previous values estimated in Table 4. The standard errors robust
to heteroscedasticity are reported in parentheses. The weighting parameters are shown in the first row. All the regressions
control for year fixed effects.
(i) (ii) (iii)
Weighting parameter λ 1.16 1.16 1.24
[fixed] [fixed] [fixed]
Earthquake experience coefficient β 631.162 630.942 522.954
(277.031) (293.373) (280.341)
NonHaz branch% -1.112 1.731
(75.189) (77.838)
Branch number% -6.209
(5.824)
Bank-level controls Yes Yes Yes
Regional controls Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Average of fitted value at 90th pct. minus fitted value 76.914 76.887 66.768
at 10th pct. of earthquake experience
Average of fitted value at maximum minus fitted value 386.371 386.237 344.355
at minimum of earthquake experience
R-squared 0.196 0.184 0.171
Observations 246 246 246
Number of banks 92 92 92
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Table 10: Robustness: Rescaling the Earthquake Magnitude
The earthquake magnitudes in my data are based on the Richter Scale that is a base-10 logarithmic scale. However, for
simplicity, the previous results treat the scale to be linear. In this table, we rescale the magnitudes by taking the natural
exponential as well as the base-10 exponential respectively. The table reports regression estimates of earthquake experiences
on capital ratio, real estate ratio, and borrowing income. We fix the shape parameter λ at their previous values estimated
using the full specifications.
Capital ratio Real estate ratio Borrower income
(i) (ii) (iii)
Panel A: Natural Logarithm
Weighting parameter λ 0.28 0.18 1.24
[fixed] [fixed] [fixed]
Earthquake experience coefficient β 3.325×10−4 -0.010 30.590
(0.000) (0.001) (12.734)
Average of actual value at 90th pct. minus actual value 0.002 -0.031 75.910
at 10th pct. of earthquake experience
Average of fitted value at maximum minus fitted value 0.034 -0.454 412.877
at minimum of earthquake experience
Panel B: Base-10 Logarithm
Weighting parameter λ 0.28 0.18 1.24
[fixed] [fixed] [fixed]
Earthquake experience coefficient β 1.801×10−7 -8.049×10−4 0.047
(0.000) (0.000) (0.025)
Average of actual value at 90th pct. minus actual value 0.001 -0.019 57.576
at 10th pct. of earthquake experience
Average of fitted value at maximum minus fitted value 0.036 -0.192 323.607
at minimum of earthquake experience
Bank-level controls Yes Yes Yes
Regional controls Yes Yes Yes
Headquarter fixed effects Yes Yes No
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 16473 10545 280
Number of banks 464 415 112
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Figure 1: Earthquake Distribution of California (2006-2010). This map plots geographical locations of earthquakes
of California for the period 2006-2010. Marker size and color darkness are both strictly increasing in earthquake magnitude
(min = 2.5, max = 6.5). The map shows 4818 earthquake events during this period. The data are obtained from the
Search Earthquake Catalog of USGS.
Figure 2: Bank Branch Distribution of California (2010). This map shows the distribution of branch offices of
California banks by the date June 30, 2010. Marker size and color darkness are both strictly increasing in bank age (oldest:
established on January 1, 1864; youngest: established on June 30, 2010). The data source is the Branch Office Deposits
data of FDIC.
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Appendix
Table 11: Terminology
This table lists definitions of the key concepts used in this paper and dependent and explanatory variables compiled from
the original data.
Concepts
California California is a state of U.S. located on the western (Pacific Ocean) coast. Its dominant
natural disasters are earthquake and wildfire.
Natural disaster A natural disaster is a major adverse event resulting from natural processes of the
Earth; examples include floods, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, tsunamis, and other
geologic processes.
Earthquake An earthquake is the shaking of the surface of the Earth, resulting from the sudden
release of energy in the Earth’s lithosphere that creates seismic waves.
Dependent variables
Real estate ratio Loans secured by real estate/total assets; source: Call Reports; frequency: quarterly.
Capital ratio Total equity capital/(total assets+allowance for loan and lease losses+allocated trans-
fer risk reserves); also know as equity ratio, equity capital ratio, or capitalization;
source: Call Reports; frequency: quarterly.
Borrower income Average borrower income (yearly) across all branches of a bank; source: HMDA
dataset; frequency: yearly.
Borrower race Number of nonwhite borrowers/number of all borrowers of a bank; source: HMDA
dataset; frequency: yearly.
Explanatory Variables
Bank/branch age The number of dates between the date of establishment and the date of the obser-
vation of the dependent variable. For instance, for the value of real estate ratio in
the 4th quarter of 2010, the bank/branch age equals 2010-12-31 minus the date of
establishment.
Branch number Number of branches of a bank; source: SOD dataset; frequency: yearly.
Imputed interest rate Interest income/ outstanding loans of the last quarter; source: Call Reports; fre-
quency: quarterly.
NonHaz region counties that has significantly less earthquakes, including replace Amador, Butte,
Calaveras, Colusa, El Dorado, Sacramento, San Joaquin, Stanislaus, Sutter,
Tuolumne, Yolo, and Yuba.
NonHaz branch% The proportion of a bank’s branches in the NonHaz region.
ROA Return on assets. Net interest income/ total assets of the last quarter; source: Call
Reports; frequency: quarterly.
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Figure 4: Closing the Circle: Positive Relationship between Bank Deposits and Real Estate Ratio. This
scatter plot shows the relationship between bank-level deposits and real estate ratio. The sample is the same as used in
Table 2.
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Figure 5: Closing the Circle: Positive Relationship between Median Household Income and County-Level
Deposits. This scatter plot shows the relationship between county-level median household income and county-level bank
deposits. The income data are from the U.S. Census Bureau and the deposit data are from the SOD dataset of FDIC.
We sum branch-level deposit by county and year to get the county-level deposit. The fitted regression line confirms the
positive relationship between the two variables.
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